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I. INTRODUCTION
Article III Section 1 of the United States Constitution grants Article III
These
judges life tenure and protection from salary diminution.'
constitutional safeguards are intended to free the courts of undue influence
from the other branches of government 2 and diminish separation of powers
concerns. 3 Nevertheless, these concerns may arise when Congress grants a
non-Article III court jurisdiction to issue final judgment in a matter under
one of the nine jurisdictional provisions constitutionally reserved for
federal courts under Article III.4
The Supreme Court has split in its existing jurisprudence concerning
separation of powers issues between Article III and non-Article III
adjudicatory bodies. The Court's decisions are divided on whether a
1. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I (promoting life tenure as Article III judges can
only be removed for good cause by impeachment).
2. See Ralph Brubaker, Article III's Bleak House (PartII): The Constitutional
Limits of the Bankruptcy Judges' Core Jurisdiction,BANKR. L. LETTER, Sept. 2011, at 1
(explaining the constitutional reasons that Article III courts are held above other nonArticle III federal courts).
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the necessity of
separation of powers in creating an independent judiciary).
4. See Brubaker, supra note 2 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 regarding the
jurisdiction of Article III courts).
5. Compare N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982) (holding that the formalist requirements of Article III limit the jurisdiction of
non-Article III bankruptcy courts), with Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986) (implementing a balancing test to determine if a
jurisdictional grant violates Article III).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss4/8

2

Clouse: Litigant Consent: The Missing Link for Permissible Jurisdiction f

2012])

LITIGANT CONSENT

901

formalist approach or a balancing test is more appropriate to determine
whether non-Article III courts have jurisdiction to issue a final judgment.
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the

Court applied a formalist approach, which focused on the traditional
separation of powers concerns of eroding Article III preeminence.
Alternatively, the balancing approach of Commodities Federal Trading
Commission v. Schor embodies a more structural approach where
efficiency is valued as having more weight than Article III jurisdictional
concerns.8
The Court recently revisited the issue of non-Article III adjudication in
Stern v. Marshall.9 In a five-four decision, the majority held that a section
of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act (BAFJA) grants
bankruptcy courts impermissible jurisdiction over state law counterclaims
in violation of Article 111.10 Despite the majority's avowal that Stern's
holding is narrow with a limited impact, the dissent expressed concerns that
a formalist approach is too broad and will reduce judicial efficiency and
therefore negatively impact the federal court system." Such concerns are
not unjustified, given that in the few months following Stern, courts across
the country have struggled to apply the holding consistently.12
In a recent case, the Fifth Circuit, sua sponte, asked litigants to
determine whether the holding in Stern, which restricts the jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts, also limits the jurisdiction granted to magistrate judges,
who are non-Article III adjudicators who may issue final judgment per 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).13 Under § 636(c), magistrate judges are able to enter a
6. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 847-49 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) and N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64, to emphasize litigant
consent).
7. See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 59-61 (noting the risk of relinquishing jurisdiction
to non-Article III courts).
8. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (implying that structural efficiency overcomes
formalist Article III concerns).
9. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011) (taking a formalist
approach to Article III jurisprudence).
10. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codifying the jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts over state law counterclaims at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)); Stern, 131 S.
Ct. at 2608 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) unconstitutional under Article III).
11. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (agreeing with the Solicitor General that the issue
is narrow). But see id. at 2629-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
holding will result in bogged down courts).
12. Compare In re Taylor, No. 11-1607, 2011 WL 362440, at *4 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that Article III courts cannot override the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
on core issues and citing Stern's dissent), with Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652
F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the litigant's claim was properly removed
from the bankruptcy court under Stern).
13. See generally Order of Sept. 9, 2011, Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v.
Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-20640) [hereinafter
Order]. As this Comment went to press, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in
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final judgment with express litigant consent. 14 By asking the parties to
address this "substantial" jurisdictional issue, the Fifth Circuit attempts to
address whether the formalist holding of Stern precludes the waiver of the
right to Article III adjudication as set forth in Schor.
This Comment argues that the requirements of Article III, as put forth in
Stern, do not prevent a litigant from consenting to a non-Article III court to
both hear and issue a final judgment by expressly waiving their
constitutional right to Article III adjudication. 16 Part II examines the
formalist limitations of non-Article III adjudication as set forth by the
Court.17 Part III argues that constitutionally limiting the jurisdiction of
non-Article III tribunals is a formalist concern, rather than a structural one,
and that such separation of powers concerns can be remedied through
litigant consent and waiver of the right to Article III adjudication.' 8 Part IV
proposes that courts interpret Stern narrowly, only limiting the jurisdiction
of bankruptcy courts if the court lacks express litigant consent. 9 Part V of
this Comment concludes that the consent of the parties can overcome the
constitutional issues of non-Article III adjudication without causing
separation of powers concerns. 20

Technical Automation Services Corp, 673 F. 3d at 401. Ultimately, the court decided
that it was not its place to overturn existing Fifth Circuit precedent as established under
Puryear v. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984). Puryearholds that § 636(c) does
not run afoul of Article III by allowing magistrate judges to issue final decisions with
the express consent of the litigants. However, Puryearpredates the Supreme Court's
decision in Schor, and like Technical Automation, it lacks relevant analysis in regards
to why consent creates permissible non-Article III adjudication. Thus, the analysis of
this comment remains relevant.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2006) (requiring the express consent of the litigants
prior to the start of magistrate proceedings).
15. See Order, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that the Fifth Circuit has the obligation
to raise the issue of Stern's effect on magistrate judges even if it was not raised by the
parties); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849 (1986)
(stating that the right to Article III adjudication is procedural, and therefore can be
waived).
16. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (stating that even small issues like the one in Stern
can create Article III constitutional issues).
17. See infra Part II (distinguishing between the limits on bankruptcy courts
specifically, and other non-Article III forums more generally).
18. See infra Part III (arguing that litigants may consent, waiving their right to
Article III adjudication, which solves the non-Article III jurisdictional question of
adjudication).
19. See infra Part IV (establishing that "jurisdictional Ping-Pong" only creates
confusion for litigants and drastically reduces the efficiency of the federal court
system).
20. See infra Part V (concluding that litigant consent may overcome Article III
jurisdictional concerns).
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II. BACKGROUND

A. LimitedJurisdictionofNon-Article III Courts
The judiciary places limits on non-Article III courts to preserve the
boundaries between the different branches of government.2 1 Currently, the
federal court system contains several non-Article III adjudicatory bodies
including administrative courts, bankruptcy courts, and magistrate judges.22
Non-Article III judges are often specialists in their field of adjudication,
though they are not afforded the same job security imparted to Article III
judges. 23 Judges sitting in such tribunals do not enjoy the same
constitutional protections against undue influence as Article III judges,
which creates an underlying tension between Article III courts and their
federal non-Article III counterparts. 24 Though the Constitution empowers
Congress to create inferior federal non-Article III courts, this legislative
allocation of judicial authority can create constitutional concerns regarding
the separation of powers.2 5
1. FormalistAnalysis ofNon-Article III Adjudication.
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the
Court held that Congress's jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts was
impermissibly broad under Article III of the Constitution.2 6 Applying a
formalist analysis, the majority in Northern Pipeline emphasized that there
are only three exceptions to the limits Article III places on Congress's

21. See N. Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)

(distinguishing Article III courts as an institutional structure that helps ensure
separation of powers).
22. See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1922) (creating the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission as an administrative adjudicatory body);
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2512 (1978) (creating bankruptcy judgeships); Pub. L. No.
90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1979) (establishing magistrate judges as adjuncts of the district
court).
23. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 (granting judges life tenure and a protected salary).
See generally James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (2004) (examining the balance

between Article III and non-Article III courts).
24. See Brubaker, supra note 2 (explaining that the holding of Stern v. Marshall

narrows the authority of bankruptcy judges); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the
Marathon: It Is Time to Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 311
(1991) (criticizing Northern Pipeline'slimitation on bankruptcy courts).
25. Cf Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2605 (2011) (explaining that granting
jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to adjudicate all state law counterclaims under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) causes constitutional concerns).
26. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (granting bankruptcy courts
jurisdiction over state law claims); N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60, 68 (citing Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280-82 (1856)
to establish the foundation for the public rights doctrine).
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power to grant jurisdiction to non-Article III bodies.2 7 These exceptions
are for territorial courts, military tribunals, and courts adjudicating public
rights.28 The Court held that bankruptcy courts did not have the authority
to decide state law claims that were only peripherally related to the
bankruptcy estate because the newly created bankruptcy judges were not
Article III judges. 29 The holding of Northern Pipeline effectively negated
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts granted under BAFJA because the
Congressional grant was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional under
Article 111.30 The Court deferred the judgment, however, to allow Congress
time to revise the law to leave bankruptcy courts in place without violating
Congress did so in the 1984 amendments to the
the Constitution.
bankruptcy code.32
2. A BalancingApproach to Article III Violations
After Northern Pipeline, the Court moved away from a formalist
analysis, implementing a balancing test to decide the question of nonArticle III jurisdiction and adjudication in Commodity Futures Trading
Examining the jurisdiction granted to the
Commission v. Schor.3 3
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") over certain state law
counterclaims in the Commodity Exchange Act, the Court relied on several
factors to determine Article III violations, including whether the litigant has
waived his right to Article III adjudication through explicit consent.34 The
Court held that though a procedural right to Article III adjudication exists,
it is not an absolute right required in all circumstances.s Balancing the
27. See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-70 (distinguishing public rights cases from
private rights cases and holding that the jurisdiction conferred on the bankruptcy court
is a private right, thus subject to Article III adjudication).
28. See id. (emphasizing that bankruptcy courts do not qualify under the Article III
exceptions).
29. See id. at 73-74 (expressing concern that non-Article III courts will be
adjudicating matters never intended by Congress).
30. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 311 (emphasizing that Northern Pipeline
invalidated the jurisdictional grant by Congress to the 1978 bankruptcy court).
31. See id. (explaining that the holding of Northern Pipeline stripped the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction).
32. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (amending the 1978 bankruptcy act
to remedy issues per Northern Pipeline); see also Brubaker, supra note 2 (explaining

that BAFJA attempted to resolve the constitutional deficiency found in Northern
Pipeline by creating categories of "core" and "non-core" proceedings).
33. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)
(enumerating the factors of the balancing test); Brubaker, supra note 2 (reasoning that
the decisions in Thomas and Schor drastically differ from the public rights approach
established in Northern Pipeline).

34. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 836 (explaining that the Commodities Exchange Act
granted the CFTC authority to adjudicate state law counter claims arising under the
initial claim).
35. See id. at 849 (explaining that Article III adjudication is a constitutional right
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various factors, the Court found that the jurisdictional grant to the CFTC
over state law counterclaims did not violate Article 111.36 To preserve
congressional intent of creating judicial efficiency, the majority found that
the grant of jurisdiction to an administrative tribunal such as the CFTC was
both necessary and not inconsistent with the demands of Article III.37 To
reconcile judicial independence with efficiency in the federal court system,
the Court held that the right to Article III adjudication can be waived, and
The
that non-Article III adjudication is constitutionally permissible.
Court ultimately upheld non-Article III adjudication, despite formalist
objections to the jurisdiction granted to the CFTC because of possible
infringements on the province of Article III.39
B. The Supreme CourtRe-adopts a FormalistApproach in Stem v.
Marshall
In its recent decision Stern v. Marshall, the Court returned to a formalist
approach to resolve whether non-Article III courts have jurisdiction to issue
final decisions where Article III or state courts traditionally have
jurisdiction. 40 The holding in Stern moves Article III jurisprudence away
from the balancing test detailed in Schor, returning the focus to the public
rights exception emphasized in Northern Pipeline.4 1 The Court held that
Congress's grant of jurisdiction over state law counterclaims to bankruptcy
courts under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) violated Article III of the
Constitution.42 Applying the formalist analysis of Article III, the Court
relied on the holding in Northern Pipeline to emphasize the limited
exceptions to Article III adjudication.4 3 Despite the return to formalism in
Stern, the Court did not foreclose the role of litigant consent as examined
that the litigant can waive).
36. See id. at 841-42, 857 (stating that judicial independence is not harmed by nonArticle III adjudicatory bodies).
37. See id. at 843-44 (discussing the impact of foreclosing the CFTC's jurisdiction
as granted by Congress).
38. See id. at 849-52 (asserting that judicial efficiency outweighs separation of
powers concerns).
39. See id. at 851-52 (explaining that a strict formalist view of Article III does not
allow for such adjudication).
40. See Brubaker, supra note 2 (differentiating between the jurisdictional grant of
Article III and non-Article III forums to issue a final decision in state law matters).
41. See id (analyzing the rejection of Schor's balancing test and the return to the
formalist approach of Northern Pipeline).

42. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (granting jurisdiction over all counterclaims
arising from the bankruptcy proceedings); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620
(2011) (finding that even this minute intrusion on Article III jurisdiction is an
impermissible incursion on the separation of powers).
43. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614, 2621 (listing Article III exceptions for territorial
courts, military tribunals, and those courts adjudicating public rights).
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by Schor." The majority emphasized that the creditor, Pierce Marshall,
was not able to fully consent to the bankruptcy court's adjudication of the
debtor's compulsory counterclaim that was brought before the court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). 45 Though it is not explicitly stated in
the holding, the majority implies that if the creditor had been able to
consent to the forum, the argument would have been moot.46
In 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), Congress granted bankruptcy judges broad
jurisdiction over proceedings related to bankruptcy matters even if those
matters were not derived from the bankruptcy.47 The Court held that this
grant of jurisdiction to adjudicate and finally decide non-core
counterclaims under state law, even if the counterclaim is compulsory,
violated Article 111.48 Thus, the Court found the Congressional grant of
jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C) impermissible because bankruptcy judges
are not Article III judges vested with the protections of the Constitution.49
The Court stated that the holding in Stern should apply narrowly, which
does not foreclose the possibility that litigant consent would allow for final
adjudication by a non-Article III tribunal going forward.50 In contrast, the
dissent in Stern applied the Court's holding in Schor, which focused on the
fact that the creditor chose to file proof of claim within the bankruptcy
court itself.5' The dissent argued that by doing so, the creditor, Pierce
Marshall, consented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction through filing a
proof of claim.52 Because the litigant affirmatively consented, the dissent
reasoned that § 157(b)(2)(C) should be constitutionally permissible and
statutorily valid.5 3 While the majority opinion agreed that § 157(b)(2)(C) is
44. See id. at 2606-07 (arguing that the creditor only consented to the bankruptcy

court's adjudication of his initial claim, not the subsequent counterclaim).

45. See id. (emphasizing that Pierce was not able to truly consent to the bankruptcy
court as a forum of adjudication).
46. See id. (implying that if the creditor was able to consent to the bankruptcy
court's adjudication, there would not be underlying Article III concerns).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (granting bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over all
counterclaims arising under, but not deriving from, the bankruptcy case).
48. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (holding that though the jurisdiction granted in 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) was facially valid, it was not constitutionally permissible).
49. See id. at 2620 (explaining that bankruptcy judges are not adjuncts of that court
nor do they enjoy the protections of Article III).
50. See id. (implying that if Pierce was able to "truly" consent to the bankruptcy
court's adjudication there would be less of an Article III concern).
51. See id. at 2623 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that much like Schor, Stern
deals with the adjudication of a state law counterclaim that arose from the proceedings
at hand).
52. See id. (arguing that filing a claim in a forum indicates implicit consent to that
forum's statutorily granted jurisdiction, including the ability to enter final judgment on
compulsory counterclaims such as those arising under § 157(b)(2)(C)).
53. See id. at 2626-27 (emphasizing the need for judicial efficiency in the
bankruptcy system).
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facially valid, it disagreed as to whether the creditor had truly consented to
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to issue a final judgment, which left
the constitutional concern intact.54
C. OtherNon-Article III Grants ofJurisdictionfor Adjudication over Final
Judgments
Magistrate judges are non-Article III judges that differ from other nonArticle III tribunals in that they act solely as adjuncts of the Article III
district court, except when exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)." As magistrate judges do not usually issue final judgments
without the approval of an Article III judge, the jurisdictional power
employed by magistrate judges is generally embodied in acting as an
adjunct to the district court, despite their status as a non-Article III
adjudicator.5 6
However, under § 636(c) of Title 28, Congress granted jurisdiction to
magistrate judges to issue final decisions in particular circumstances
without the supervision of the district court.57 Section 636(c) allows
magistrate judges to issue a final judgment outside the supervision of the
district court only if the parties expressly consent to the magistrate judge's
adjudicatory authority.ss This grant of jurisdiction is different from the
grant of jurisdiction in § 157(b)(2)(C), in that § 636(c) requires the express
consent of the parties.5 In Technical Automation Services Corp. v. Liberty
Surplus Insurance Corp., the Fifth Circuit raised the issue, sua sponte, of
whether the jurisdiction granted under § 636(c) is permissible under Article
III of the Constitution regardless of whether the parties expressly consent to
the jurisdiction of the court under the holding of Stern.60

54. See id. at 2600 (majority opinion) (expressing concern that the counterclaim

was already finally decided in a Texas probate court prior to the decision by the
bankruptcy court).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2006) (granting magistrate judges jurisdiction to issue
a final judgment independent of the district court with the consent of the parties).
56. But see Pfander,supra note 23, at 765 (stating that the expansion of magistrate
judges' authority through jurisdictional grants by Congress may infringe on the
purview of Article III).
57. See Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (allowing magistrate judges to act
independently of the district court's oversight).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (stating that final decisions may be issued without the
oversight only "upon consent of the parties").
59. See id. (requiring the express consent of the parties to proceed independent of
Article III supervision).
60. See Order, supra note 13, at 1 (questioning whether the holding of Stern should
be applied more broadly to other non-Article III jurisdictional grants other than
§ 157(b)(2)(C)).
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III. ANALYSIS

The holding in Stern is only intended to affect state law counterclaims
filed in bankruptcy court that are not critical to the resolution of the
Though the overall language of Stern addresses
bankruptcy estate.6
broader issues of Article III jurisprudence, it does not call into question the
jurisdiction of all non-Article III forums of adjudication.62 Rather, the
Court structured the holding around the overbroad statutory grant of
jurisdiction within § 157(b)(2)(C) to the non-Article III bankruptcy courts
because the statute itself threatened to foreclose the litigant's right to
Article III adjudication. Distinguishing the facts of Stern from the facts
of Schor, the Court chose not to overrule Schor, which allows litigants to
consent to non-Article III forums by waiving their right to Article III
adjudication.64
A. Stem Failsto Explicitly Address the Effect ofLitigant Consent on the
JurisdictionofNon-Article III Courts.
Because the Court holds that parties may waive their right to Article III

adjudication, the jurisdictional problem Stern creates by relying solely on
the formalist requirements of Article III is resolved by analyzing the facts
under Schor.6 1 Schor embodies a pragmatic approach to judicial efficiency,
which highlights the ability to consent to waive the right to Article III
adjudication. 6 Stern's holding emphasizes this right by stressing the
inability of the creditor to consent to the non-Article III forum of the
The Court in Stern erred, however, by not applying
bankruptcy court.
Schor to its analysis, but instead relying on Northern Pipeline.68 In doing
so, Stern has created a jurisdictional struggle where some litigants may
have no alternate forum to bring their compulsory counterclaims.69
61. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011) (emphasizing the

importance of Stern's connection to Northern Pipeline, which was specific to the

jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts only).
62. See id. at 2620 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the opinion will not have a
broad, far-reaching effect).
63. See id. at 2621 (stressing that the litigant had no other choice of forum for the
counterclaim adjudication).
64. See id. at 2606 (majority opinion) (distinguishing Stern from Schor so as to not

overrule it).
65. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1982)

(stating that Article III rights can be waived, resolving separation of powers concerns).
66. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607 (citing § 157(c)(2) to emphasize that litigants may

consent to the bankruptcy court as a forum).

67. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (emphasizing that the right to Article III
adjudication may be waived like all procedural constitutional rights).
68. But see Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615 (distinguishing between the jurisdiction
granted to the CFTC in Schor and the jurisdiction granted under § 157(b)(2)(C)).
69. See id. at 2629-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stressing the implications of the
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1. Applying Schor's Balancing Test, the Court in Stern Would Have Found
the JurisdictionalGrant Under § 157(b) (2) (C) Permissible.
Under Schor's balancing test, the Court would not have found
Congress's jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) to be
impermissibly broad under the Constitution. When applying the factors of
Schor to the facts of Stern, it becomes evident that the jurisdictional grant
imparted by § 157(b)(2)(C), though broad, does not create separation of
powers concerns in violation of Article III. 70 The purpose of Schor's
balancing test is to weigh the constitutional right to Article III adjudication
against the purpose and function of the non-Article III forum.n By
choosing specific factors to balance against each other, the Court can then
determine whether a separation of powers concern exists between the
judicial and legislative branches through the jurisdictional grant.72
a.

Under FactorOne of the Schor Balancing Test, the Court in Stern
Would Have Found the JurisdictionalGrantof § 15 7(b) (2) (C)
Impermissible.

A final adjudication of a non-core counterclaim under § 157(b)(2)(C) by
a bankruptcy judge would be imferimissible under the first factor of Schor.
The first factor of the Schor test examines the essential attributes. that
distinguish Article III courts from other courts.73 The essential attributes of
Article III create a barrier against possible political influence and confer a
sense of judicial impartiality because of the protections granted to Article
III judges.74 Bankruptcy judges, on the other hand, are Article I judges,
selected and confirmed by the district court. As such, bankruptcy judges
do not enjoy the protections of Article 111.76 Because § 157(b)(2)(C) grants
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over non-core counterclaims arising under

majority's holding on bankruptcy cases).
70. See id. at 2624 (relying on the "clear majority" of Schor to support the
jurisdiction granted under § 157(b)(2)(C)); Schor, 478 U.S. at 850 (listing the balancing

test factors: the essential elements of Article III, infringement on Article III, origins and
importance of the adjudication right, Congress's intent, and litigant consent).
71. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 850 (emphasizing the purpose behind Article III
limitations on non-Article III adjudicatory forums).
72. See id. at 851 (stating the various measures by which the balancing test is
structured for Article III).
73. See id. (highlighting the formalist requirements of the text of Article III).
74. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 (granting Article III judges life tenure and
protection against salary diminution).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (codifying the selection and confirmation process

of bankruptcy judges).

76. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing the privileges of Article III
judges), with 28 U.S.C. § 152 (establishing bankruptcy judgeships under Article I
rather than Article III).
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state law, there is greater potential for a final judgment to lack the essential
impartiality of Article III adjudication.
The right to have a cause of
action adjudicated by an Article III judge arises from the concept of a right
to an impartial forum.
Therefore, the jurisdictional grant under
§ 157(b)(2)(C) would be impermissible under the first factor of Schor
because it grants a non-Article III adjudicator the authority to issue a final
judgment over counterclaims, even if they are unrelated to the core matters
of the bankruptcy case.
b.

Under FactorsTwo and Three of the Schor Balancing Test, the
Court in Stern Would Have Found the JurisdictionalGrant of
§ 157(b) (2) (C) Permissible.

Not all counterclaims brought under § 157(b)(2)(C) definitively infringe
on the traditional jurisdiction of Article III; such counterclaims would be
permissible under the Schor balancing test, though it is not dispositive.
The second factor under Schor considers whether Congress's grant of
jurisdiction to non-Article III courts encroaches on powers historically
reserved for Article III courts.80 Because these jurisdictional areas are
reserved for Article III adjudication under the Constitution, when Congress
reallocates a jurisdictional grant it can create a separation of powers issue.81
In § 157(b)(2)(c), Congress granted jurisdiction over non-core
counterclaims, even those arising under state law, to bankruptcy courts. 82
Because Congress used extremely broad language when it granted
bankruptcy court jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C), it is possible the grant
infringes upon the province of Article III's jurisdictional claim. Much
like the claims in both Northern Pipeline and Stern, the counterclaim at
issue in Schor was a state law claim. 4
However, since non-core
77. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (indicating that non-Article III adjudications can
threaten the balance of powers by reducing the impartial and independent nature of the
judiciary).
78. See id. at 848 (stating that Article III adjudication safeguards the impartiality of
the judiciary).
79. See id. at 851 (emphasizing that each factor alone, including consent, cannot be
dispositive).
80. See id. at 850 (listing the second factor of Schor's test).
81. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 (naming the nine areas over which Article III
courts have explicit jurisdiction).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (granting jurisdiction over any counterclaim
brought on behalf of the bankruptcy estate).
83. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (noting the various grants of jurisdiction over
state law issues), with 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (granting jurisdiction over any
counterclaim, regardless of origin, brought by the debtor).
84. Compare Schor, 478 U.S. at 853 (explaining the state law nature of Schor's
counterclaim), with N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84
(1982) (emphasizing that the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over state law claims is
overbroad), and Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011) (explaining that
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counterclaims may arise under state law amongst non-diverse parties, it is
not definite that all counterclaims brought under § 157(b)(2)(C) would
always be under the traditional jurisdictional purview of Article 111.85
Therefore, it is not dispositive that the jurisdiction granted to the
bankruptcy courts under § 157(b)(2)(C) encroaches upon traditional Article
III jurisdiction." Because the finding is not dispositive under the second
factor of Schor, the grant of jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C) is
permissible under Article 111.87
Because it is not definite that all counterclaims brought under
§ 157(b)(2)(C) would not fall under one of the exceptions to Article III
adjudication, the third factor in the Schor test would be permissible under
Article III, though it is also not dispositive. The third factor of Schor
examines the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated by an
Article III court, namely whether the right in question falls under one of the
The Court has
three primary exceptions of Article III adjudication.
carved out distinct exceptions to Article III adjudication to address where
the litigant is not entitled to an Article III judicial review.89 The option of
Article III adjudication is required for the counterclaims at issue in
§ 157(b)(2)(C) because they do not fall under the stated exceptions to
Article III adjudication.90 Nevertheless, since the counterclaims present
under § 157(b)(2)(C) may arise from state or federal law, it is not
dispositive that such a counterclaim would not be a public right.91 As the
counterclaims brought under § 157(b)(2)(C) are not one particular type of
claim, they may qualify under the public rights exception; however, to date,
causes of action brought under bankruptcy have not been considered a
public right. 92 The grant of jurisdiction under the third factor of Schor is
because the nature of the counterclaim arose under state law, an Article III issue was
raised).
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (emphasizing that any origin of a counterclaim
might not necessarily be state law).
86. But see Schor, 478 U.S. at 852 (explaining that jurisdiction granted to the
CFTC did not encroach on the traditional jurisdiction of Article III courts).

87. See id. at 851 (reaffirming that the factors of the balancing test are not

dispositive).
88. See id. (naming the factors of the balancing test used in the analysis to
determine whether jurisdiction is permissible under Article III of the Constitution).
89. See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 65-67 (enumerating the exceptions to Article III
adjudication including territorial courts, military tribunals for courts martial,

administrative courts and the adjudication of public rights cases).
90. See id at 67 (emphasizing that the jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy courts
does not fall into any of the three stated exceptions to Article III adjudication).
91. See id. at 68 (explaining where public rights arise from (citing Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855))).
92. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that bankruptcy does not fall within any of the exceptions to Article III,
including public rights).
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permissible under Article III because it is not dispositive that all
counterclaims filed under § 157(b)(2)(C) in a bankruptcy court would
never fall under any of the stated exceptions to Article III adjudication.93
c.

Under the Fourth andFifth Factorsof the Schor Balancing Test,
the Court in Stem Would Findthe JurisdictionalGrant of

§ 157(b)(2)(C) Permissible.
Because counterclaims brought under § 157(b)(2)(C) precipitate from a
cause of action filed by the creditor in the bankruptcy court, the grant of
jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C) does not foreclose an Article III forum,
and is therefore, permissible under the fourth factor of the Schor test. The
fourth factor under Schor considers why Congress departed from Article III
adjudication and chose instead to bestow jurisdiction on a peripheral
adjudicatory body.94 In Schor, the Court emphasized that Congress's
primary goal in granting the CFTC jurisdiction to adjudicate counterclaims
was efficiency, and not to circumvent barriers put in place to ensure
separation of powers.95 Similarly, Congress's grant of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts under § 157(b)(2)(C) is not intended as a way to
circumvent the district court; thus, the district court was intended to remain
a viable forum.9 6 Rather, because compulsory counterclaims must be filed
in a timely manner or be lost to the litigant, § 157(b)(2)(C) serves as a way
to grant jurisdiction over counterclaims that would naturally arise over the
course of complex bankruptcy litigation, as was the case in Stern.9 7
Therefore, under the fourth factor of Schor, the grant of jurisdiction in
§ 157(b)(2)(C) would be permissible because it did not circumvent
alternate forums for the litigants, but rather allowed the litigants to
streamline litigation in an efficient manner.9 8
The fifth and arguably most significant factor that Schor weighs is
whether the parties involved in the litigation consented to the non-Article
III forum.99 Article III specifies nine jurisdictional grants that are unique to
93. See id. at 2612 (majority opinion) (highlighting the factors from which public
rights are derived).
94. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1982)
(listing the fourth factor of Schor's balancing test).
95. See id. at 842 (explaining Congress's intent in promoting efficiency through the
creation of the CFTC).
96. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2629 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (comparing Congress's
grant of jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C) to the grant in Schor).
97. See id. at 2626 (emphasizing that the litigant loses the chance to raise a
counterclaim if not brought forward under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
7013).
98. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 834 (emphasizing that efficient adjudication is allowed
without raising Article III concerns).
99. See id. at 838-39 (explaining that Congressional grants of jurisdiction may not
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federal courts. 00 These jurisdictional mandates create a procedural right to
0
However, even though the litigant has the
Article III adjudication.o'
procedural right to Article III adjudication, he may choose to waive this
right, even when it originates under the Constitution. 10 2 Further, under
Schor, a waiver to Article III adjudication may be either implied or
express.10 3 Because § 157(b)(2)(C) gives bankruptcy courts jurisdiction for
any counterclaim filed by the debtor, it is questionable whether the creditor
has consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court as to the
counterclaim.10 Under Schor, however, because a creditor would be aware
of the extent of the jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy court under
§ 157(b)(2)(C) when he filed his claim, he implicitly consented to the rules
and structure of that forum. 0 5 Therefore, even if the debtor brings forward
a counterclaim, because the creditor has chosen to litigate his proof of
claim in the bankruptcy court, he has implicitly consented to the
adjudication of a non-Article III forum under the fifth factor of Schor.10 6
After examining the bankruptcy courts' grant of jurisdiction under
§ 157(b)(2)(C) and all of the Schor factors, it is clear that while it fails
factor one, the jurisdictional grant under § 157(b)(2)(C) is permissible
under factors two, three, four, and five.107 Therefore, had the Court
appropriately applied the Schor factors to the Stern facts, the Court would
have held that the bankruptcy court's jurisdictional grant under
§ 157(b)(2)(C) was permissible because it does not create a separation of
powers violation under Article III of the Constitution. 08

exceed Article III without the consent of the litigants (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide

Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985))).
100. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 (listing the areas of Article III jurisdiction that are
reserved for Article III adjudication).
101. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848-49 (stating that the ability to waive the right to
Article III adjudication is connected to its nature as a personal, procedural right).
102. See id. at 849 (noting that procedural rights may be waived even if
disseminated from the Constitution).
103. See id (explaining that waiver of the right to Article III adjudication on the part
of Schor could have been either express or implied).
104. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2606 (2011) (emphasizing that the
creditor could not truly consent to the bankruptcy court's adjudication).
105. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 850 (stating that Schor waived his right to Article III
adjudication by litigating in the CFTC).

106. See id. at 849 (stating that Schor's waiver of his right to proceed in an Article

III court was derived implicitly by his proceeding in the CFTC).
107. See id. at 851 (reviewing each of the five factors of the balancing test set forth
in Schor's analysis).
108. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2625 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the virtue of
balancing factors as espoused in the holding of Schor).
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2. Had the Court Applied the BalancingFactors of Schor in Addition to
the FormalistAnalysis ofNorthern Pipeline in Stern, It Would Have Found
the JurisdictionalGrant in § 157(b) (2) (C) Impermissible Under Article III,
While DirectlyAddressing Litigant Consent and Retaining the Formalist
Structure ofArticle III.
Applying the Schor balancing test in conjunction with the formalist
requirements of Northern Pipeline, the Court in Stern would have found
the grant of jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C) to be constitutionally
impermissible. However, the analysis under both Schor and Northern
Pipeline demonstrates that the jurisdictional grant is overbroad because the
litigant did not expressly consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court, not because of a separation of powers concern.1 09 While the
formalist approach of Northern Pipeline appears to be at odds with the
Schor balancing test, the formalist considerations of Northern Pipeline
comprise aspects of the Schor factors.o10 As such, Schor does not overrule
Northern Pipeline, but rather builds off its foundation."' Thus, when
§ 157(b)(2)(C) is analyzed using the formalist requirements of Article III as
put forward in Northern Pipeline alongside the consent standard from
Schor, it becomes evident that the concern in Stern is not the broad
jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy courts, but rather the infringement on
the litigant's right to Article III adjudication. 112
Because Article III adjudication is a procedural right that can be waived,
a litigant who consents to non-Article III adjudication avoids a separation
of powers concern under the Constitutional auspices of Article III."' The
Court in Schor establishes that a litigant may consent to non-Article III
adjudication.1 4 To waive the right to Article III adjudication, the litigant
must first have chosen the forum.1 5 Second, the litigant must have by his
109. See Schor, 478 U.S at 849 (holding that consent of the litigant can either be

express or implied). But see Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607 (explaining that the creditor

could not consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court).

110. Compare N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59-60

(1982) (enumerating the formalist requirements of Article 1II), with Schor, 478 U.S. at
851 (stating that the Court is disinclined to adopt a formalist approach to Article III).
11l. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (explaining the "essential attributes" of Article III
courts, which are derived from the formalist analysis of Article III).
112. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607 (emphasizing the inability for Pierce, the creditor,
to consent to the bankruptcy court as a forum for adjudication or properly remove to
district court).
113. See id. at 2620 (determining the litigant had not waived his right to Article III
adjudication).
114. But see Schor, 478 U.S. at 866 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
majority erroneously relies on consent to distinguish separation of powers concerns).
115. See id at 849 (majority opinion) (emphasizing litigant choice of forum as a
determinative factor).
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own action waived his right to Article III adjudication."' 6 And, third, the
court must have jurisdiction over the issue.
Under Schor's first factor in determining litigant consent, the Court in
Stern would have found that the creditor in Stern did not choose the
bankruptcy court himself as the forum for adjudication of the
counterclaim." 8 In Northern Pipeline, the jurisdiction granted to the
bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act was found to have been overbroad
because it did not allow an alternate Article III forum for the litigants.19
Much like Northern Pipeline, Stern does not offer litigants the opportunity
to either waive the right to Article III adjudication under § 157(b)(2)(C) or
remove to an Article III court.120 However, under Schor, the parties must
consent to waive Article III adjudication in the first instance, meaning that
there must exist a real choice between an Article III court, state court, or
federal non-Article III adjudicatory forum.121 Both parties must consent to
the choice of forum as each party has an independent procedural right to
Article III adjudication.122 In Stern, it is evident that the creditor did not
consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the counterclaim
because he did not choose the forum himself.12 3 Rather, the debtor
controlled the choice of forum when she filed the compulsory counterclaim
in the bankruptcy court. 124
Second, the litigant must have waived his right to Article III
adjudication.12 5 Because the creditor did not truly consent to the
116. See id. (emphasizing that Schor himself had chosen the forum of the CTFC
knowing that it would adjudicate any related counterclaims).
117. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (finding that because the final adjudication of the
bankruptcy claim did not rest on the resolution of this counterclaim, the issue would
not have been under the jurisdiction of the court barring the consent of the litigants).
118. Compare Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (highlighting that the choice of forum was the
litigant's prerogative in the first instance), with Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607 (driving home
that the litigant was not able to choose an alternate forum to litigate the debtor's
counterclaim).
119. See N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982)
(emphasizing that the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over state law claims is
overbroad, limiting litigant's choice of forum).
120. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2606 (emphasizing the creditor's lack of legitimate
consent which could allow a non-Article III adjudication of the counterclaim within the
constitutional bounds of Article III).
121. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (explaining that the choice of forum is implicit in
whether a non-Article III adjudication causes constitutional concerns).
122. See id. at 848-49 (pointing out the nature of Article III adjudication as a
personal right governing procedure, held by each individual litigant).
123. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (emphasizing that the only forum available to the
creditor was the bankruptcy court).
124. See id. at 2607 (arguing that the choice of forum for the compulsory
counterclaim was out of the creditor's hands, and thus he could not consent to it).
125. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (implying that the waiver of Article III adjudication,
either express or implied, constitutes litigant consent to non-Article III jurisdiction).
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jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, he did not affirmatively waive his
constitutional right to Article III adjudication. 12 6 The creditor consented to
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by filing a proof of claim to decide
that single claim.127 Unlike the proof of claim, which is a cause of action
brought by the creditor, the counterclaim has no alternative forum available
in which the creditor could litigate. 12 8 The creditor in Stern did not waive
his right to Article III adjudication in regards to the counterclaim filed by
the debtor.12 9 Under § 157(b)(2)(C), removal of the counterclaim from the
bankruptcy court to the district court was not possible. 3 o Rather, as a
creditor, Pierce Marshall had no choice but to allow the bankruptcy court to
adjudicate the counterclaim, thus his mere presence cannot be deemed as
consent.13 Additionally, the counterclaim filed pursuant to § 157(b)(2)(C)
would have also infringed upon the purview of Article III because the
creditor under § 157(b)(2)(C) has no mechanism by which to withdraw the
referral to the bankruptcy court and remove the matter to the district court,
thus preserving his right to Article III adjudication.1 32
Finally, the court must have jurisdiction over the cause of action for a
litigant to meaningfully consent to waive his or her right to Article III
Though the bankruptcy court had statutory jurisdiction
adjudication. '
over the counterclaim filed by the debtor through § 157(b)(2)(C), applying
the formalist requirements of Northern Pipeline to Stern shows that the
jurisdictional grant under § 157(b)(2)(C) is unconstitutionally overbroad.13 4
126. Compare Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (stating the forum could not be consented to
because he had no choice where the issue was litigated), with Schor, 478 U.S. at 849
(highlighting that forum choice can result in implicitly waiving Article III adjudicatory
rights).
127. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607 (noting the creditor only consented to final
judgment over his original proof of claim).
128. See id. (explaining that the broad grant of jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C)
limited the creditor to the forum of the bankruptcy court, infringing on his Article III
rights).
129. See id. at 2620 (underscoring that the creditor could not consent to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the counterclaim, and thus did not waive his
Article III right).
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (granting broad jurisdiction to issue final
judgment to the bankruptcy court).
131. Contra id. (failing to offer provision for removal to the district court for
counterclaims as independent causes of action).
132. See N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982)
(stating that Congress granted overbroad jurisdiction, which the parties could neither
consent to nor remove from).
133. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)
(listing the various factors that create the balancing test determining the
constitutionality of non-Article III jurisdictional grants).
134. Compare Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (stating that the jurisdiction granted under
§ 157(b)(2)(C) is statutorily permitted, if not constitutionally), with id. at 2620 (stating
that the overbroad grant of jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C) violates the formal
requirements of Article III).
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Because § 157(b)(2)(C) grants bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over an area
of jurisprudence normally reserved for Article III or state courts without
allowing the litigant opportunity to seek out another forum, it creates a
separation of powers issue under Article III.1' Thus, the litigant would be
unable to appropriately waive the right to Article III adjudication.16
B. Because § 636(c) Requires the Parties' Express Consent, the
JurisdictionalGrant to MagistrateJudges Does Not Violate Article III of
the ConstitutionDue to the Express Consent Requirement.
Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrates Act allows a magistrate judge
to act independently of the district court by presiding at trial and entering
final judgment.1 7 In Technical Automation Services Corp. v. Liberty
Surplus Insurance Corp., the Fifth Circuit asked litigants to examine
whether, under Stern, the congressional grant of jurisdiction to magistrate
judges in § 636(c) is an overbroad grant of jurisdiction, and therefore
unconstitutional.' 38 Similar to § 157(b)(2)(C), which grants jurisdiction to
bankruptcy judges to adjudicate state law claims, § 636(c) grants magistrate
judges authority independent of the district court.' 39 However, while
§ 157(b)(2)(C) does not require the consent of the parties, § 636(c) requires
explicit consent by the litigants.14 0 The jurisdictional issue examined in
Stern does not apply to magistrate judges because of the statutory language
in § 636(c) requiring the consent of the parties.141 Because Stern did not
overturn Schor, the Fifth Circuit should have applied Schor to analyze the
jurisdictional grant under § 636(c).14 2 Further, the Schor balancing test
captures the formalist requirements of Article III as well as litigant consent
which reflects the statutory language of § 636(c), only allowing magistrate
135. Compare N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 78 (holding that the overbroad grant of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1979) violates the formal Article III), with Stern,
131 S. Ct. at 2608 (holding that § 157(b)(2)(C) is impermissible under Article III
because the jurisdictional grant is overbroad).
136. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607 (emphasizing that the litigant is unable to consent
to non-Article III jurisdiction).
137. See Pub. L. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (establishing magistrate judges as
adjuncts of the district court).
138. See Order, supra note 13, at 1 (asking whether the jurisdiction granted under
§ 636(c) should be considered in light of Stern, implying that it may be impermissible
under Article III).
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (granting jurisdiction to finally decide state law
counterclaims); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (allowing magistrate judges to act independently of
the district court).
140. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (explaining that the jurisdictional grant of
§ 157(b)(2)(c) violates Article III because it is constitutionally overbroad).
141. See id. at 2620 (recalling that the holding is intended to be exceptionally
narrow).
142. See id. at 2613-14 (distinguishing Stern from Schor to emphasize the difference
in the modes of consent for the two cases).
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judges to proceed upon the consent of the parties.14 3
1. If the Fifth CircuitHadApplied the Analysis of Stem, It Would Have
IncorrectlyFound the JurisdictionalGrant of§ 636(c) Impermissible.
Under Stern, the Fifth Circuit would incorrectly hold that § 636(c) is an
overbroad jurisdictional grant under the formalist requirements of Article
III as magistrate judges are not Article III judges and because it does not
fall under the exceptions to Article III adjudication.'44 To discern whether
the grant of jurisdiction to magistrate judges under § 636(c) creates a
separation of powers concern under Stern, the court would first examine
the formalist requirements of Article 111.145 Magistrate judges do not enjoy
either life tenure or salary protection of Article III, and therefore lack the
essential elements of Article III courts as enumerated in the Constitution.14 6
Further, the district court must approve the decisions made by the
magistrate judge; therefore, the issued judgments do not infringe upon the
concept of an independent judiciary, which Article III intends to
preserve. 14 The single exception to this symbiotic relationship is § 636(c),
which authorizes magistrate judges to issue a final decision independently
of a district court's supervision.148
While § 636(c) grants magistrate judges the jurisdictional authority to
issue a final decision independent of the district court's supervision,
§ 636(c) requires the parties to expressly waive their right to Article III
adjudication before initiating proceedings. 14 9 Because there is a clear
choice of forum and the party expressly waived his right to Article III
adjudication when he consented to have a magistrate judge preside over the
matter, § 636(c) does not infringe on the auspices of Article 111.150
143. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (laying out the consent requirement for

magistrate judges to proceed independently), with Commodity Futures Trading

Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (listing the "essential elements" of Article

III as factors of the Schor test).
144. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (listing the formal requirements of Article III such
as salary protection and life tenure).
145. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (granting the judiciary independence by
awarding life tenure and salary protection).
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2006) (codifying the appointment and tenure of
magistrate judges as adjuncts of the district court).
147. Compare Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (creating magistrate judges
as adjuncts of the district court), with Schor, 478 U.S. at 860 (confirming that Article
III is intended to preserve an independent judiciary).
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (authorizing magistrate judges to act without the
oversight of the district court).
149. See id. (requiring the explicit consent of the parties to proceed independent of
the district court).
150. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(implying that if Pierce was able to "truly" consent to the bankruptcy court's
adjudication there would be less of an Article III concern).
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Nevertheless, because the Court in Stern did not expressly allow the waiver
of Article III rights to cure the infringement on the right to Article III
adjudication, under Stern, § 636(c) would be impermissible as an
overbroad grant of jurisdiction to a non-Article III forum.151
2. Under the Schor Balancing Test, the Fifth Circuit Would Have Found
the JurisdictionalGrant of§ 636(c) Permissible.
Under Schor, each of the balancing factors enumerated would have to be
examined in order to determine whether the grant of jurisdiction to
magistrate judges is permissible under Article III of the Constitution.15 2
The first factor of Schor examines the essential elements that distinguish
Article III courts from other courts.' 53 Because § 636(c) grants magistrate
judges authority to exercise their discretion independently of the district
court, even though they do not have salary protection or life tenure, it
implicates separation of powers concerns. 154 Section 636(c) clearly calls
into question the essential elements of Article III, which are intended to
preserve independence of the judiciary, and would therefore be
impermissible under the first factor of Schor.
The second factor of Schor examines whether Congress's grant of
jurisdiction intrudes on the traditional jurisdiction of Article III courts. 55
Much like the CFTC in Schor, a magistrate judge merely presides over an
alternate forum, which is able to adjudicate a party's legal action.'s
However, because the jurisdictional grant to magistrate judges under
§ 636(c) overlaps directly with the district court, it is presumed this
jurisdiction infringes on traditional auspices of Article 111.15 But because
§ 636(c) requires the consent of the parties before proceeding, it does not
displace the Article III courts and would be permissible under the second
prong of Schor.'58
151. See id. at 2607, 2620 (holding that the jurisdictional grant under § 157(b)(2)(C)
is impermissible under Article III because bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges).
152. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (noting that no one factor of the balancing test

weighs more than another).
153. See id. (listing the formalist requirements of the text of Article III that create its

"essential elements").
154. See Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (establishing magistrate judges as
adjuncts of the district court).
155. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-52 (explaining that the CFTC's jurisdiction is not an
intrusion on Article III).
156. See id. at 852-53, 855 (maintaining that there was more than one forum
available for Schor to litigate in and that he was not limited to the CFTC).
157. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609-10 (2011) (promoting the
formalist requirements of Article III to maintain separation of powers amongst the
branches of government).
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2009) (requiring the consent of the litigants to
proceed independently of the district court).
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The third factor in Schor analyzes the origins and importance of
jurisdiction being granted to non-Article III courts. 159 The purpose of
§ 636(c) is to increase judicial efficiency via an alternate forum at the
discretion of the parties. 160 Again, because the forum does not supplant the
district court but merely augments it, as with the CFTC in Schor, the
jurisdictional grant should not be deemed overbroad. 61
The fourth factor in Schor weighs Congress's motivations in departing
from Article III adjudication.1 62 Similar to the third factor in Schor, the
motivation behind the grant of jurisdiction to act independently under
§ 636(c) is to promote judicial efficiency. 16 3 As such, the adjudication of a
magistrate judge as opposed to a district court judge may be both more
expedient and efficient for the parties.164 Efficiency alone, however, may
not suffice to prevent § 63 6(c) from being overbroad under Article 111.165
The fifth, and final, factor of Schor examines whether the litigant waived
the right to Article III adjudication through consent. 166 The jurisdiction
granted to magistrate judges under § 636(c) is permissible under Article III
because it requires litigant consent in the first instance.' 67 The essential
function of § 636(c) is to provide a procedure through which a party may
waive their right to Article III adjudication."' Because § 636(c) requires
each party to expressly waive the right to Article III adjudication before
magistrate judges may preside over a case, the jurisdiction granted under
§ 636(c) to issue final judgment is not constitutionally overbroad. 6 9
159. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (listing the third factor of the Schor test as the

significance of the jurisdictional grant).
160. See generally Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (creating magistrate
judges as adjuncts of the district court).
161. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 852-53 (explaining that because the CFTC's jurisdiction
is specific, it is therefore not overbroad in terms of the constitutional requirements of
Article III).
162. See id. at 851 (naming the fourth factor as Congress's justification for departing
from traditional Article III adjudication).
163. See generally Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (promoting magistrate
judges as aids to district court judges in an attempt to streamline caseloads).
164. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 842 (explaining the purpose behind the creation of the
CFTC to improve and facilitate adjudication, which mirrors the intent of § 636(c)).
165. See id at 857 (noting that no one factor can be individually determinative as to
whether the scope of jurisdiction undermines Article III).
166. See id. at 848-49 (positing that while consent is not dispositive in determining
whether Article III has been violated, it is a factor that must be considered).
167. See id. at 849 (stating that the litigant must choose the forum in the first
instance, at the start of litigation, for consent to be express).
168. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the
Separation of Powers, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 2107, 2136 (2009) (explaining that
Justice O'Connor's holding in Schor provides the ability for a party to waive the right
to Article III adjudication in favor of a non-Article III judicial forum).
169. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (highlighting that the right to Article III
adjudication is dependent on the litigant's waiver of their Article III right).
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Therefore, § 636(c) would not constitute a violation of Article III under the
Schor analysis as the express consent of the parties to waive their right to
Article III adjudication is required, and the grant of jurisdiction is specific
and narrow to the instance at hand.
The Fifth Circuit should not apply Stern, which should be limited to
bankruptcy courts, to decide whether the jurisdictional grant of § 636(c) is
permissible under Article III of the Constitution. 170 Rather, the Fifth
Circuit should apply the analysis of Schor and find that § 636(c) is
constitutionally permissible as it requires parties to expressly waive the
right to Article III adjudication.'7 1 As the right to Article III adjudication is
procedural, when a party waives this right, the jurisdiction of the nonArticle III forum does not create a separation of powers concern.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION

The Supreme Court's analysis in Stern creates friction for Article III
jurisprudence going forward.172 On one hand, it signals a return to a
formalist interpretation of Article III, as seen in Northern Pipeline.17 3 On
the other hand, it seemingly ignores the balancing test for permissible nonArticle III adjudication set forth by the Court in Schor.174 While embracing
a more literal interpretation of Article III may prevent Congress from
overstepping its constitutional prerogatives, this view limits the judicial
efficiency and flexibility offered by non-Article III adjudicatory forums. 7 1
Additionally, by not addressing what "true" consent would look like, Stern
creates jurisdictional issues for those state law counterclaims that may arise
under § 157(b)(2)(C) but otherwise cannot be litigated in the district court,
even if referral to the bankruptcy court is withdrawn.' 7 6
When applying Stern going forward, courts should limit its application to
state law counterclaims that are non-core and that lack express litigant
consent to waive the right to Article III adjudication. The holding in Stern
170. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (stating that Congress may
not encroach on Article III jurisdiction without violating separation of powers).

171. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (emphasizing implicit consent to waive the right to
Article III adjudication as a factor).
172. See Adam Lewis, et al., Stern v. Marshall: A JurisdictionalGame Changer?,

Sept. 2011, at 6 (espousing the consequences of the decision
in Stern regarding judicial efficiency).
PRATT'S J. OF BANKR. L.,

173. See Pfander, supra note 23, at 660-62 (examining the formalist structure behind
the decision in N. Pipeline).

174. See id. at 662-63 (discussing the influence of the holding in Thomas v. Union
CarbideAgriculturalProducts Co. on the Court's balancing test as put forth in Schor).
175. See id. at 656 (stating that a literal interpretation of Article III severely limits
the federal court system).
176. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (stating that if the counterclaim is not brought forth,
the option to raise it is forfeit).
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should be narrowly applied because it does not call into question the
jurisdiction of all non-Article III forums of adjudication."' Rather, the
holding is central to the idea of a jurisdictional grant foreclosing a litigant's
However, because Stern leaves the
right to Article III adjudication.'
holding of Schor intact, Stern does not preclude litigant consent so long as

that consent is express.17 9
The holding in Schor specifically allows parties to waive their right to
Article III adjudication, and the emphasis in Stern on "true" consent
requires litigants to do so expressly.180 Thus, going forward, when
addressing whether the jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy courts is
overbroad under Article III, courts should analyze the facts under the
holding of Stern together along with the litigant consent standard as
articulated in Schor.'8 1 Additionally, when examining the jurisdictional
grant to other non-Article III tribunals, courts should analyze the facts
under the holding of Schor and not Stern.182 Courts will be able to
appropriately gauge whether a violation of Article III has occurred without
losing the efficiency of non-Article III adjudication by placing emphasis on
whether the litigants have explicitly consented to the non-Article III forum
and have waived their right to Article III adjudication.' 83
V. CONCLUSION

Going forward, the Fifth Circuit should analyze 20 U.S.C. § 636(c)
under Schor and not Stern. Ultimately, Stern did not overrule the precedent
set forth in Schor and therefore litigants may still waive their right to
Article III adjudication through consent.' 84 The holding in Stern was
intended to affect a small section of state law counterclaims filed in
177. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (stating that the holding of
Stern is intended to apply narrowly).
178. See id. at 2619-20 (underscoring that the litigant had no other choice of forum
for the counterclaim adjudication).
179. See id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing the importance of litigant
consent).
180. See id. (emphasizing that consent to waive Article III adjudication has to be
more than implicit).
181. See supra Part III.A.2. (applying Schor's litigant consent standard to N.
Pipeline'sformalist structure).
182. See supra Part III.B.2. (analyzing Schor's balancing test with litigant consent
standard to the jurisdiction of magistrate judges as applicable under § 636(c)).
183. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
case law in both Thomas and Schor require a balanced look at the efficiency of nonArticle III adjudication as well as the more formal factors of Article 1II, such as litigant
consent).
184. See id. at 2606-07 (majority opinion) (emphasizing the importance of creditor's
consent to the bankruptcy court as a forum for his proof of claim, waiving the right for
that cause of action to be decided by the district court).
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bankruptcy court that are not crucial to the resolution of the bankruptcy
estate, and not to bring into question other jurisdictional grants to other
non-Article III tribunals."' 'While Congress may not waive the right to
Article III adjudication through a jurisdictional grant such as the one given
under § 157(b)(2)(C), it is a procedural right that can still be waived by
express litigant consent such as the grant under § 636(c). 18 6 Therefore,
going forward, Stern should be applied narrowly to only bankruptcy courts.
Other grants of jurisdiction to non-Article III tribunals, such as the one
within § 636(c), should be analyzed under Schor.'87 Following this
application of analysis, courts will be able to distinguish between a
jurisdictional grant that infringes on the auspices of Article III by limiting
the forum available for adjudication, and one where the litigant is able to
simply waive the right to Article III adjudication through consent.

185. See id. at 2615 (emphasizing the connection to the holding in N. Pipeline which
was specific to the jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy courts).
186. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49
(1986) (proclaiming that as a procedural right, the right to Article III adjudication can
be waived by litigants).
187. See supra Part IV (explaining that the holding of Schor is more applicable to

determining separation of powers issues amongst non-bankruptcy non-Article III
tribunals).
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